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THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTS FOR THE
SALE OF REAL ESTATE.
The law of Pennsylvania defining the conditions under
which the parties to an agreement for the sale of real estate may
enforce the agreement, the extent to which they may enforce it,
and the manner in which they may enforce it, differs in many
important particulars from the law prevailing in other states.
These differences, to some extent due to capricious judicial decis-
ion, result as the more or less immediate consequences of the
following three legal propositions: (1) The common law courts
of Pennsylvania administer equitable principles in common law
forms of action; (2) the jurisdiction of the equity courts in
Pennsylvania depends entirely upon statutory enactments and
is not general but confined to certain specifically enumerated
subjects; (3) the fourth section of the Statute of Frauds is not
a part of the law of Pennsylvania.
INADEQUACY OF THE LEGAL REMEDIES.
It was characteristic of the common law courts of England
that they never laid a command upon a litigant nor sought to
secure obedience from him. Their commands were directed to
their executive officer, the sheriff; and it was through the physical
power of the latter, coupled with the legal operation of his acts
and the acts of the court, that rights were protected by the com-
mon law. In some cases the sheriff was commanded to do what
the defendant should have done. Thus if real property belonging
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to the plaintiff 'was wrongfully detained by the defendant, the
command issued to the sheriff was that he should dispossess the
defendant and deliver possession to the plaintiff. In the majority
of cases, however, the command issued to the sheriff was that he
should seize and sell the defendant's property and pay the plaintiff
a certain amount out of the proceeds of the sale.
The latter was the only remedy afforded for the breach of
a contract to buy or sell property. The common law regarded
money as the measure of every loss and afforded no remedy
by means of which one could recover the specific property which
another had agreed to sell to him. It is "true that for a
considerable period of time the English law adhered to
Frankish custom in not distinguishing between contract and
title as a ground for specific recovery, and allowed a covenant
to convey lands to be enforced in an action of covenant, in which
the covenantee was entitled to recover the lands, but the use of
the action of covenant for this purpose disappeared at an early
date,1 and an action for damages became the only remedy for
breathes of contracts to sell property. 2 The idea of the common
law judges as expressed by Coke, C. J., was that to enforce a
contract specifically "would subvert the intent of the covenantor,
since he intended to have his election to pay damages" or to per-
form the contract.'
In regards to contracts for the sale of personal property
the remedy afforded by the common law was in most cases
adequate. The common law rule respecting the sale of chattels
was that where there was an unconditional contract for the sale
of specific goods, the title to the goods passed to the buyer when
the contract was made, and it was immaterial whether the time
of payment, or delivery, or both, were postponed. If under
the rule, the title had passed to the buyer he was entitled to bring
an action of detinue for their recovery in specie. Detinue
was, in theory, a proprietary action. By it the plaintiff sought
th recovery of the goods in specie. It has been said to be "the
'M artin's Civil 'Procedure 46.
2Fry on Specific Performance 27
"Bromage v. Jenning, 1 Roll R 368. The view that a party when he
gives a promise must be held to contemplate the payment of damages
or performance at his option has recently been asserted by high authority,
Justice 0. W. Holmes, but is not generally accepted.
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only remedy by suit at law for the recovery of a specific chattel
in specie unless in those cases where replevin lies."'  As a matter
of fact, however, even in detinue, an obstinate defendant could
not be forced to give up the chattel itself. The judgment is in
the alternative, i. e., for the return of the chattels claimed or
their value with damages,-- and the practical working of this
judgment resolved the proceeding into an action for damages as
far back as Bracton's time;" and, as in the action of detinue the
defendant could wage his law, the action was surplanted by
trover, which was free from wager of law, and which accomplished
the same purpose, to wit; a judgment in damages for the value of
the goods detained.7
The action of replevin for the recovery of the possession
of specific chattels could, at common law, be maintained only
where the goods were wrongfully taken from the owner. It did
not extend to cases of wrongful detention merely, and, therefore,
was not available to one who sought to recover in specie goods
which he had purchased.8
If under the rules of the common law the title to the goods
which were the subject of contract had not passed to the pur-
chaser, his only remedy was an action for damages. The measure
of damages was the difference between the contract price and the
market value at the time and place of delivery.
Whether the purchaser recovered the value of the goods
in an action of detinue or trover or damages for the loss of his
bargain, his remedy was in most cases adequate. In either case,
the money so obtained enabled him to go into the market and
purchase property of the same kind and quality. The object
of the purchaser is not ordinarily the possession of any specific
grain, lumber, or other chattel to which the contract relates. Any'
grain, lumber, etc., conforming to the description in the contract
will answer the object of the purchaser as well; and, therefore,
"Perry Common Law Pleading. 56.
'Perry Common Law Pleading 56.
6Martin's Civil Procedure 78.
'Martin's Civil Procedure 125.
"Martin's Civil Procedure 98. In practice the action was confined to
cases where there had been a wrongful distress. It has subsequently been
extended so as to include all cases where one man claims personal property
which is in the possession of another.
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if he is allowed such damages as will enable him to go into the
market and purchase the same kind and quality of goods, com-
plete justice has been done. Where, however, the property had
either a pretium affections, or value from some other peculiar
cause, or could not ordinarily be bought in the market, or had a
value which could not. be estimated by any known common law
rules, the common law remedies were manifestly inadequate.
In the case of real property, as in the case of personalty,
the common law afforded a remedy whereby property belonging
to the plaintiff could be specifically recovered. But the title to
real property did not, as in the case of personalty, pass to the
purchaser upon the making of an unconditional contract for its
sale. Certain additional acts of a formal character were neces-
sary before the title would pass. Where the title had not passed,
the possession could not be recovered by the purchaser in any
common law action. The only remedy afforded was an action
for damages. 9 The measure of damages in this action is a
matter as to ivhich there is considerable conflict of authority,10
but, conceding that the vendee might recover the loss of his
bargain, it is obvious that the legal remedy was nevertheless
generally inadequate.- Immobility is a distinguishing character-
istic of real property and this renders it necessary, in estimating
its value, to consider an element which need not ordinarily be
cofisidered in estimating the value of personalty. This element
is location. The value of real estate is chiefly determined thereby,
and it is nearly always a controlling consideration in. the making
of a contract for the sale of real property. It follows that the
action at law for damages was not an adequate remedy because,
since no two pieces of real estate can have the same location,
the money recovered by the purchaser did not enable him to go
into the market and purchase property having the same location.
-This difference between real and personal property was not
recognized by the common law judges. In Gollen v. Bacon,
1 Bulst 112, Fleming, C. J., said, "If one does promise for to give
me a .horse for twenty shillings, afterwards he does not perform
this; I am not to go and sue in chancery for my remedy, but at
common law by an action on the case to recover damages; and
if the law be so in case of a horse a multo fortiori it will be so
9Bispham's Equity 516.
"1 Sugden V. & P. 542.
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in case of a promise to make an assurance of his land upon good
consideration."
THE EQUITA3LE REMEDY OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Courts of equity have always employed the very methods of
compulsion and coercion which the common law courts wholly
rejected. When a person is complained of to a court of equity,
the court first ascertains and decides what, if anything, the person
complained of ought to do or refrain from doing; then by its
decree or order, it commands him to do or refrain from doing
what it has decided he ought to do or refrain from doing; and
finally, if he refuses or neglects to obey the decree, it punishes
him by imprisonment. This method was borrowed by the early
chancellors from the canon law."
In accordance with this system courts of equity began, at
an early date, to decree specific performance of contracts for the
sale of property. 12 Such jurisdiction was assumed in regards
to both personal and real property. 3  The origin and early
grounds of the jurisdiction are probably conjectural, but the
accepted theory is that the jurisdiction was assumed because of
the inadequacy of the remedies at common law ;14 and the inade-
quacy of the legal remedy is still stated as the test of the juris-
diction. " "The doctrine is fundamental that specific perfor-
mance will be decreed only in those classes of cases,. in which,
according to the views taken by the courts of equity, the legal
remedy of conpensatory damages is, from its essential nature,
insufficient and fails to do justice between the litigant parties."' 6
In applying this rule, however, courts of equity have established
the further rule that the legal remedy of damages is inadequate
in all agreements for the sale of real estate, and therefore in
such cases specific performance is always granted unless pre-
vented by other independent equitable considerations. It is as
much a matter of course for a court" of equity to give specific
performance as it is for a court of law to give dankages, and no
cases can be found where equity has declined jurisdiction in
'See Landell, Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction 26, for the reasons.
which caused the adoption.
"Bispham's Equity 516.
'26 A. & E. Encyc. 103.
"Fry on Specific Performance 30.
"26 A. & E. Encyc. 17,, 103.
'1 Pomeroy's Equity 309.
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reference to a contract for the sale of real estate on the ground
that the purchaser had an adequate remedy at law.'7
Specific performance was first decreed in favor of the
vendee. The earliest reported case is Cokayn v. Hurst (1458).
For nearly a century this case remained the only reported instance
of a decree for the specific performance of a contract. The
assumption of this jurisdiction by the courts of equity was
strongly opposed by the common law judges and it was not until
the reign of James I that the jurisdiction of the equity courts
to decree specific performance was firmly established. Since
that time the jurisdiction of equity has been unquestioned. Having
gone this far the courts of equity went further and declared
that the vendor should also have their aid if the vendee refused
to execute his contract. Since the vendee's duty generally con-
sists in nothing beyond the payment of money, the necessity for
the intervention of a court of equity in behalf of the vendor is
not apparent. It is settled, however, with scarcely any dissent,"8
that specific performance will be granted in favor of the vendor
of land as freely as in favor of the vendee, though the relief
actually obtained by him is usually only a recovery of money-
the purchase price.1" In explanation of this rule various theories
have been advanced. It has been said that the remedy in equity
is based upon the inadequacy of the remedy at law, the latter
remedy being inadequate because the measure of damages is the
difference between the market price and cohtract price, whereas-
the vendor might stand in need of the whole sum agreed to be
paid. The objection to this theory is that, if carried to its logical
conclusion, it would render every contract for the sale of personal
property specifically enforceable in equity at the suit of the
vendor. The doctrine of equitable conversion, whereby the vendee
becomes a trustee of the purchase price for the vendor, has also
been advanced as an explanation of this rule. The objections to
this theory are that the trust is a purely constructive trust and
results from, rather than creates the right to specific performanceY'
The inadequacy of this theory is further shown by the fact that,
"though the doctrine of equitable conversion does not extend
' Merwin's Equity 33. But see 26 A. & E. Encyc. 18.
'As to the exceptional rule in Pennsylvania see infra.
1"6 Pomeroy's Equity 1261.
"Bispham's Equity 454.
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to contracts for the sale of chattels or things in action, the cases
are numerous in which such contracts have been specifically
enforced at the suit of the vendor.:" The usual and most satis-
factory explanation of the rule is the doctrine that where an
equitable remedial right is recognized in favor of the vendee, a
cotresponling remedial right should be, recognized in favor of
the vendor in order that the remedies may be mutual.
The remedy of specific performance is one of the most bene-
ficent in the whole range of equity jurisprudence. It "prevents
the intolerable travesty of justice involved in permitting parties
to refuse performance of their contracts at their pleasure by
electing to pay damages for their breach.
22
It is also an extraordinary and distinctive remedy and is one
of the paradoxes of legal history. Popular government has
attained its highest development in the United States and the
British Empire, yet only irL these two countries is it permitted to
so far invade the liberty of the individual as to compel him
specifically to perform his contract or to suffer imprisonment.
The doctrines of equity are derived, to a great extent, from the
civil law but "Nemo potest praecise cogi ad factum" was the
rule of the civil law. In France and Germany, and presumably
other European states, pecuniary compensation is the sole remedy
for a breach of contract.
23
HISTORY OF THE EQUITY JURISDICTION OF THE EARLY
COURTS OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Thelawof Pennsylvania turnishes, to both vendor and vendee,
methods for obtaining specific performance of contracts for the
sale of real estate, but these methods differ materially from those
in use in other jurisdictions. These differences are due to his-
torical accidents in the development of equity in Pennsylvania,
and a knowledge of the history of equity in Pennsylvania is nec-
essary in order that they may be understood. From 1664 until
1681, with the exception of a brief period (1673-1674), the gov-
ernment of New York extended over the territory subsequently
granted to William Penn. It is a matter of record that during
=Withy v. Cottle, 1 Sim. & St. 174; Adderly v. Dixon, 1 Sim. & St.
607; Cogent y. Gibson, 33 Beav. 557.
'Fuller, C. J., in Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. C., R. I., & Pac. Ry. Co.,
163 U. S. 600.
'See article by James B. Ames, 1 Green Bag 26.
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tnis period chancery jurisdiction was exercised by the Governor
of New York over what subsequently became the Province of
Petnsylvania .2 * The charter of Pennsylvania was granted to
Penn on March 4th., 1661. The fifth section of tne charter
vested in I-enn the right of appointing judges and establish-
ing courts with such powers and forms of procedure as
snould seem to him most convenient, in deference to tne
wishes of the people, 'enn was willing to relinquish tnis
extraordinary right. By the Frame of Government, which was
drawn up by Penn in England, and which constituted the consti-
tution under which the Province of Pennsylvania was organized,
the government was entrusted to the Governor and freemen of
the province. The. freemen were t- elect a Provincial Council
and a General Assembly. The power of erecting courts was
entrusted to the Governor and Council, but it seems that this
provision was never practically carried out, for when new courts
were created, the concurrence of the Assembly was invariably
required to the bill for their erection.
25
After drawing up the Frame of Government, Penn sent his
cousin, "William Markham, to take possession of the province
and act as deputy Governor. Markham arrived about July 1st,
1681, but did little in the way of establishing a government.
In the fall of 1692, Penn sailed for Pennsylvania, and 'arrived
in New Castle on October 27th. Two days later Penn went to
Upland, which is now Chester, to call the first Assembly. No
Council having been chosen, the Assembly met alone and passed
what has ever since been called the "Great Law" of Penna.
The Great Law provided that in every county there should
be one court erected; from this lay an appeal to the Provincial
Court, composed of not less than five judges who should hold
quarterly sessions; and from this court an appeal lay to the Pro-
vincial Council which was the court of last jurisdiction. The
jurisdiction of the county courts was at first of a singularly
indefinite character, and seems not to have included equity
powers.2 0 Penn apparently was not an admirer of equity courts.
In a letter dated August 16th, 1683, he describes the Indians as
"not perplexed by chancery suits," and refers to the erection of
2Hazard's Annals of Penna., 424.
'Lewis, Courts of Penna. in the 17th Century.
'Lewis, Courts of Penna. in the 17th Century.
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courts of justice in every county.27 No Provincial Court was
established until 1684, and until that date the Provincial Council,
when called upon, no doubt exercised chancery jurisdiction as it
had been exercised before the charter by the Governor of New
York.
28
In 1684 two bills respecting equity courts were passed. The
first provided that the county courts should be courts of equity
as well as of law. The second created a Provincial Court which
was to be a court of appeal from the county courts, and which
was alsb to try all cases, both in law and equity, not triable in
the county courts.
29
Little is known of the form of procedure under these acts.
Notwithstanding the statement of Mr. Laussatt to the contrary,"0
the distinction between the law and equity sides of these courts
was strongly marked ;81 and the proceedings on the equity side
were according to the rules of chancery practice. 82 Instances are
extant in the early history of Pennsylvania when a court, sitting
in equity, reversed its own judgment, previously entered while
sitting, as a court of law. 8
It is believed, however, that little business was transacted
on the eauity side of either of these courts ;84 and it is also very
orobable that the equity administered was not the technical and
scientific equity of lawyers, but a sort of natural equity based
unon popular rather than technical, notions of equity.3 5 There
is evidence that the people did not have a clear conception of the
eniiitable nowers 'of these courts. for, in 1687, the Assembly
desired the Council to explain how far the cnu, ts "m y be judges
of equity as well as law.86 To this inquiry the Council male an
evasive and eauivocal answer.8 7
"Proud's Hist. of Penna., 262.
'Wilson's Chancery in the- Colonies.
"Duke of York's Laws, 1§7, 168.
"Laussatts Equity in Pa.,'20
'1Rawle's Equity in Pa. 10.
'Courts of Pa. in the 17th Century.
'Hastings v. Yarnall, Records Chester Co. Ct., 3 d. 1 wk. 10 mo.
1686. 5 d. 1 wk. 10 mo. 1686.
"Fisher's Equity in Penna.
"McCall's Address before Law Academy of Phila., 1838.
"I Colonial Records, 142.
'1 Colonial Records, 441.
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At this period in the history of Pennsylvania, there seems
to have been a party which entertained a strong distrust of
equitable powers. In 1690 a bill to strike out the word equity
from the powers given to the courts passed first reading in the
House,38 and though never actually passed, it "doubtless repre-
sented the views of many in the Province."39
The complaints of the people were principally concerning
the practice of the equity courts in reversing judgments pre-
viously obtained at law. Though from the very first there seems
to have been a party Which disapproved on principle of chancery
powers, it is a mistake to suppose that the people were unani-
mously opposed to the introduction of equity jurisdiction. Through-
out the entire early history of Pennsylvania there was always a
party which wanted courts of chancery and made efforts to
get them.
In 1690 an act was passed confirming the equity jurisdiction
of the county courts but limiting it to causes under the value of
ten pounds. The English Government repealed this law in 1693.
It was reenacted in 1700, but apparently produced no results. 4 °
In 1701 an elaborate act remodelling the courts of the col-
onies, and apparently repealing all prior regulations concerning
e'ffiity, was passed. This act gave equity powers to the Common
Pleas courts and an appeal in equity cases to the Supreme Court.
The act provided that the proceedings should be by bill and
answer with such other pleadings as are necessary in chancery
courts." It has been stated that "nothing came of this act."'42
Certain it is that in 1703 complaint was made that, to the great
oTnpression of the people, no court of equity had been held in
pursuance of this law. 43 The act was repealed by the home
eovernment in 1705.
At this period began the lofig and bitter quarrel between
the Governor and Provincial Council and the General Assembly
upon the ouestion whether the Governor of the Province should
be chancellor. The Governor contended that he, by virtue of
asI Votes of Assembly, 57.
'Lewis, Courts of Penna. in 17th Century.
4*Duke of York Laws, 184, 225.
'2 Colonial Record, 23.
"Fisher's Equity in Pa.
"2 Colonial Records, 115.
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his commission, was entitled to be chancellor, while the Assembly
was opposed to any extension of the Governor's power. The
question was bitterly contested on eacu side and lasted through-
out three entire sessions.4 4 At last in 1710, after the death of
Governor Evans, who had claimed the office of chancellor for
himself, an act was passed which provided that a court of equity
should be held by the Common Pleas four times a year in every
county, and that these courts should observe as near as may be
the practice of the courts of chancery in England.45  Appeals
could be taken to the Supreme Court and questions of fact were
to be decided by issue at law before the Common Pleas. The
act was repealed within three years on the ground that it would
make proceedings in equity very dilatory and unnecessarily
increase the business of the common law courts.
Two years later another attempt was made by the passage
of an act providing for the establishment of a Supreme or Pro-
vincial Court of Law and Equity. It was provided that the
procedure should be according to the English chancery practice.
This act was repealed in England in 1719. 40 "The colonists had.
by the terms of their charter, five years within which to transmit
their laws for approval, and, after their passage, they would
keep them here and act under them as long, within that period.
as they decently could; they were then sent to England and.
when repealed there, other laws. as .nearly similar as they dared
to pass would be enacted here. ' ' 47 This has been suggested as
the reason why so long a time elapsed between the organization
and abolishment of the variouls courts having chancery juris-
diction to which reference has been made.4 8
Tn 1717 William Keith became Governor of Pennsylvania.
At the time of his accession comnlaints as to the administrationi
of justice were constantly being made. Courts had not been held
for many years, and " the confusion of the iudiciarv had reached
an alarminz height and was the cause bf great injury to the
colonists." 4' 9 To remedy these conditions, courts of inferior
"2 Colonial Records, 274, 288.
'Bradford's Laws, Ed. 1714, p. 120.
41 Carey and Boren Law of Pa., 110.
'"Rawle's Equity in Pa., 18.
"'Rawle's Equity in Pa.
"Laussatt's Equity in Pa., 22.
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and superior jurisdiction were immediately erected, and in 1720
Keith, in a message to the assembly, suggested the erection of a
court of chancery and requested the opinion of the assembly
in respect thereto. On the next day a resolution was unani-
mously passed by the assembly requesting the Governor, "to open
and hold a court of equity for the province, with the assistance
of such of his council as he shall think fit etc."50 On the tenth
of August, 1720, the Governor, with the consent of the Council,
issued a proclamation creating a court of chancery and granting
to it the same powers and jurisdiction as were possessed by the
court of chancery of England. It was provided that the Governor
should be chancellor, but that no decree should be pronounced
by him without the assent of two or more of his six oldest
counsellors. This provision for the introduction of chancery
powers differed from all previous attempts. By their previous
legislation the colonists had attempted to give chancery juris-
diction to the common law courts,-to create courts having a
law and an equity side. The proclamation of 1720 created a chan-
cery court as a distinct tribunal. It was the first, last, and only
separate court of chancery that Pennsylvania ever had.
The government in. England seems not to have objected to
this court, and did not interfere with it., It lasted for sixteen
years and" transacted considerable business. Unfortunately for
the court's existence the Governor was its chancellor, and the
people were so jealous of any power exercised by the king, or
his representative, the Governor, that in 1736 petitions wet'
presented to the Assembly complaining of the court as a violation
of the Charter of Privileges, granted by Penn to the people in
1701, which provided that no person should, at any time, be
obliged to answer any complaint relating to property before
the Governor and Council, or in any other place but in the ordi-
nary courts of justice.51 The Assembly took the same view,
and a bill was introduced vesting the power of determining suits
in equity in the Common Pleas judges. After an angry corres-
pondence between the House, on one side, and the Governor52
and Council, on the other, the Assembly adjourned without
passing the act, and the Governor continued to act as chancellor
'3 Col. Records, 100.
"Charter of Privileges, sec. 6.
'2Gordon had succeeded Keith in 1726.
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until his death, which occurred a few months afterward. Logan,
who succeeded Gordon, yielded to the views of the Assembly
and no subsequent governor has ever attempted to exercise
chancery powers.
For the next hundred years little was accomplished toward
the introduction of chancery jurisdiction. By the constitution
of 1776 the courts were given the powers of a court of equity
so far as related to the perpetuation of testimony, the obtaining
evidence from places outside of the state, and the care of the
persons and property of the insane; and the legislature was given
power to grant to the courts such other chancery powers as should
be found necessary, not inconsistent with-the constitution. The
only additional powers granted by the legislature were a method
of supplying lost deeds and instruments, 8 and a proceeding in
the nature of a bill of discovery against garnishees in foreign
attachments.1
4
In 1790 a convention was called for the purpose of adopting
a new constitution. The question of giving chancery powers to
the courts, and, indeed, of creating a separate court of chancery
was carefully considered, but, in spite of the strenuous efforts
of some of the most distinguished members of the convention,
little was done towards introducing chancery jurisdiction. The
only change made was that, in place of the concluding clause of
the constitution of 1776, the following clause was inserted in
that of 1790, "and the legislature shall vest in the said courts such
other powers to grant relief in equity as shall be found necessary;
and may, from time to. time, enlarge or diminish those powers,
or vest them .in such other courts as they shall judge proper
for the administration of justice." Power was thus given to the
legislature to establish a separate court of chancery. This power
was never exercised.
In fact, for nearly half a century, the legislature did little
in the way of exercising the power given to it by the constitu-
tion. From 1790 to 1836 the only additional chancery powers
given to the courts were the power to compel trustees to account,
to appointand dismiss them, and to compel the specific performance
of contracts to sell lands, in cases where the grantor had died.
It appears, therefore, that, for a period of over one hundred
"Act of March 28, 1786.
"Act of September 28, 1789.
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and fifty years, with the, exception of a period of sixteen years
(1720-1736) the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was compelled
to administer justice without the aid of a court of equity, and,
indeed, without a court possessing, except to a very limited extent,
chancery powers; and that this state of things was occasioned
not entirely by "the jealousy of the principles and practice of that
court entertained by the people,"but first, by the conflict of opinion
between the legislature of the Province and the privy council in
England, as to the expediency of establishing a court with chan-
cery powers; secondly, by the conflict between the governors
and the legislature as to who should be chancellor; and finally,
after the revolution, by the distrust entertained by the colpnists
of everything that savored of unusual power, and the belief, which
existed in many quarters, that the necessity for the granting of
chancery powers had been obviated by the actions of the common
law courts.
EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES ADMINISTERED THROUGH COMMON LAW
FORMS.
The necessity for some method of administering equitable
principles was appreciated by the courts at an early date. It was
soon found that, in a growing and enlightened community, whose
natural resourses were great, industries varied, and whose trade
and commerce were extensive and growing, the lack ,nf some
method of administering equitable principles meant, in many
cases, a failure of justice. In the absence of a court having
chancery jurisdiction, the judges were compelled, in order to
prevent this failure of justice, to invent some method of admin-
istering equity. This was accomplished by the adoption of the
principles, doctrines, and rules, of equity as a part of the law
of the state. The decision in common law actions was made to
depend, not solely upon the strict rules of law, but upon the rules
of equity as well; and, as a consequence, the scope and effect of
the common law actions were greatly modified. Common law
actions were used to enforce purely equitable claims; purely
equitable defences were permitted in such actions; and, to a
very limited extent, purely equitable reliefs were obtained by
means of actions at law. The courts "dug channels through the
barriers of the common law and through them they attempted
to make the waters of equity flow." 55 "They adopted equitable
uFisher, Equity in Penna.
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principles without disturbing the. ancient landmarks of the law.
They let in the changes called for by progressive improvement
at every point where they had a real and living place of useful-
ness, but in the absence of a court of chancery they wrought
them into the fabric of law as it was, and administered them
with admirable ingenuity through common law forms."58  The
precise time at which the courts began to administer equitable
principles through common law forms is not known. There are
authorities which say it was done from the beginning.5 T This,
however, has been questioned by high authority.58 The first
reported case on the subject is Swift v. Hawkin, 1 Dallas 17,
decided in 1768, in which, in an action of debt on a bond, the
defendant was permitted to prove failure of consideration on
the ground that, since "there was no court of chancery in the
province," it was necessary in order to prevent a failure of justice.
The Chief Justice added that he had known this to be the practice
for thirtv-nine years past.5 9 This system was consistently devel-
oped by the courts, and at the present time it may be said, "All
courts in Pennsylvania are Courts of Equity, whether proceeding
by bill or action at law."60
SPECIFIC PERFOtPMANCE IN COMMON LAW ACTIONS.
By means of this system, which is correctly described as the
administration of equitable principles through common law forms,
fairly adequate methods of obtaining specific performance were
afforded both vendor and vendee.
The vendor of lands was permitted to recover possession,
if withheld from him by the vendor, in an action of ejectment.
The vendee's title is not a legal title, and the use o" the action of
ejectment in this connection.was, therefore, in direct contra-
vention of the well settled common law rule that to support
ejectment the plaintiff must be clothed with the legal title to the
lands in question01  The exact time at which this method origi-
nated is not known.6 2 In the first reported case, Hawn v. Norris,
4 Binney 78, (1811), the court charged the jury that "although
"Morton's Estate, 201 Pa. 271, Per Mitchell, C. J.
'Brightly, Equity in Pa. 5, Laussat, Equity in Penna., 55.
S'Rawle, Equity in Penna., 52.
rBut as to this statement see Rawle, Equity in Penna., 55.
"Sime v Norris, 8 Phila. 84, per Sharswood, J.
'10 A. and E. Encyc., 482.
aLaussatt, Equity in Pa., 252.
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ejectment was not a mode of enforcing articles of agreement
according to the law of England, because there the party might
go into a court of chancery, and the chancellor if it was a proper
case would decree a deed; yet in Pennsylvania for want of a
court of chancery a practice had arisen at a very early date of
enforcing articles by ejectment whenever a chancellor in England
would enforce them." The court further stated that the power
of the courts thus to enforce agreements had been frequently
exercised before seventeen hundred and ninety..
This case was followed by many others, and it is now a well
established rule that an action of ejectment may be maintained
by the vendee against the vendor to enforce specific performance
of n contract for the sale of real estate whenever a court of equity
would sustain a bill for that purpose. 63 In the use of the action
of ejectment for this purpose the courts adopted the chancery
1)rinciple that that shall be considered as done, which in eauity
and good. conscience should have been done originally.6 ' This
action is in substance a bill for snecific performance and is gov-
erned by the principles of equity. "An ejectment to enforce specific
nerformance of a purchase, being with us a substitute for a bill
in eni'itv." says Gibson C. T.,6" "is affected with all those consid-
Prtions that would affect a bill for that purpose in the contem-
plation of a chancellor."
The action of ejectment was the usual method by which con-
tracts for the sale of realty were specifically enforced at the suit
of the vendee until a very recent date, and is still frequently
neqed for that purpose.
In addition to the action of. ejectment, another method of
obtainine snecific performance was furnished to the vendde. He
could enforce specific performance by means of an action of
... p. nt. nssimnsit, or debt, by asking for a verdict for the
value of the land or such other sum as would compel the vendor
to make a deed rather than nay the damaze, and the verdict of
the iurv would be given for this sum, subject to the condition
that it should be released upon the making of a deed within a
specified time and the paying of the costs. 6  In regard to 'this
'P. and L. Dig. Dec. Vol. 5, c. 7408.
"Christy v. Brien, 14 Pa., 249.
'Brawdy v. Brawdy, 7 Pa., 158.
"Irvine v. Bull, 7 Watts, 323, Stevenson v. ICMeppinger, 5 Watts, 420,
Decamp v. Feay,.5 S. and R., 323, Findlay v. Keim, 62 Pa., 116, Waflzener
v. Roth, 93 Pa., 443.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
method of enforcing specific performance it was said that "not
having a court of chancery our predecessors adopted modes of
using and applying common law actions, unknown where 'there
is a commoni law court and also a court of chancery.' O
'Iwo methods were also provided by which a vendor could
obtain specific performance. He was permitted to recover, in
an action of debt, covenant, or assumpsit, the purcnase price
agreed upon in the contract of sale.," This was a direct violation
of the common law rule that in an action at law the vendor could
not recover the purchase price, but merely damages for the breach
of the contract, and that the measure of damages was the ditter-
ence between the market price and the contract price.';' The
common law action when used for this purpose is in the nature
of a bill for specific performance and the rules of equity deter-
mine whether or nbt a recovery shall be had.-,
In explanation of the use of common law actions for this
purpose it was said, "in England the remedy in this case would
properly be in a court of chancery. We have no such court
in thig state; but it has been long and well established that equity
is a part of the law of Pennsylvania, and lest there should be a
failure of justice, our courts, blending the principles of equity
with the dry rules of the common law, with the aid of a jury,
will do what a court of chancery would do; and this practice is
essential in many cases to the due administration of justice."7"
"For want-of courts of chancery we are obliged in our practice
to adopt chancery principles and chancery remedies in many
instances in which such-a course.is refused by courts of common
law in places where there is a court of chancery."
Another method of obtaining specific performance was pro-
vided for the vendor by the common law courts. The common
law rules relating to the action of ejectment were so modified
as to permit its use by the vendor as a substitute for a bill for
specific performance. The purpose for which an action of eject-
ment was brought at common law was to obtain possession of
'Irvin v. Bull, 7 Watts, 323, per Huston, J.
Magaw v. Lathrop, 4 W. and S., 316, Ellet v. Paxon, 2 W. and S., 418,
Murray v. Ellis, 112 Pa., 485, Tripp v. Bishop, 56 Pa., 427, Bower v.
Cisna, 62 Pa, 149.
'29 A. and E. Encyc., 719-720.
TMagaw v. Lathrop, 4 W. and S., 321, Huber v. Burke, 11 S. and R.,
t'Huber v. Burke, 11 S. and R., 238, per lower court.
"Magaw v. Lathrop, 4 W. and S., 321, per Sergeant, J.
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real estate. The verdict in the action was unconditional; if for
the plaintiff, it gave him the unconditional right to obtain posses-
sion by legal process; if for the defendant, it gave him the uncon-
ditional right to retain possession. The plaintiff could not recover
unless clothed with a legal title,78 and it was equally well settled
that the defendant could not set up an equitable title as a
defence. 4 A vendee in possession under a contract of sale could
not set up the contract as a defence. The only remedy avail-
able to him was a bill in equity for specific performance and an
injunction against legal proceedings by ejectment in -the mean-
time.75
In Pennsylvania the courts recognized and administered, in
the action of ejectment, the equities of the vendee arising from
the contract of purchase,' The contract was held to be a good
defence to an action of ejectment in any case where it would
have furnished sufficient ground upon which a court of equity
would have issued an injunction to restrain the action,"6 and, as
the injunction of the chancellor was conditioned upon the vendee's
performing his duty under the contract, so the contract was ad-
mitted as a defence to the ejectment only upon the condition that
the vendee perform his duty within a specified time.
As.a result the action of ejectment came to be used in Penn-
sylvania as a substitute for a bill for specific performance. The
vendor used the action for the purpose of constraining the vendee
either to abandon possession, or to perform his duties under the
contractY.7  If, as a defence to the action, the vendee showed
facts which entitled him, on the performance of certain acts,
to retain possession, the verdict was for the plaintiff, subject to
the condition that it should be defeated if, within a certain time,
the defendant should perform these acts. If within the time
mentioned in the verdict the defendant did not perform his duties
"10 A. and E. Encyc., 533.
"10 A. and E. Encyc., 533.
"See Crosbie v. Tooke, 1 Mylne and Keen; 431.
"6Forum Vol. XI, No. 5, p. 1. In Greenlee v. Greenlee, 22 Pa., 226, it
is hel.! that an cjectment by the holder of the legal title is to be regarded
in the light of a bill in equity and may be defended against by proof of a
contract which might be insufficient to justify a decree for specific per-
formance.
"Shaw v. Bayard, 4 Pa,, 257; Riel v. Gannon, 161 Pa., 289.
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under the contract, his equities became extinct.78 The vendor's
action presupposed that he still retained the legal title. If he
had conveyed the .title the remedy was not available.79
The use of the action of ejectment in this manner violated
the well setled common law rule that a defendant could not set
up an equitable title as a defence to an action of ejectment, and
the equally well settled rule that a verdict in a common law action
could not be conditional. The action is still used for this purpose
in Pennsylvania."0
EQUITY JURISDICTION GIVEN TO THE COURTS.
Admirable as were the devices and contrivances by which the
courts sought to obviate the evil effects arising from the lack of
chancery juridiction, they were found inadequate to the require-
ments of a large and prosperous state.8  To give effect to equit-
able principles in actions strictly according to the common law
was no easy task. 2 The success of the Pennsylvania courts in
so doing has been described as "the greatest achievement in mod-
ern jurisprudence.'"82 When, however, it came to equitable rem-
edies and the practical execution of equitable doctrines the com-
mon law courts failed. The common law courts offered no
remedies which were adequate substitutes for the remedies of
equity, and from the lack of these remedies the Pennsylvania
system was unable to supply the needs of a great commercial
state. It is true (as has already been shown) that in some cases
equitable reliefs were obtainable through the verdict of a jury
in a common law action, and it has been ably argued that if the
common law courts had been a little more pliant and ingenious,
adequate substitutes for all the remedies of equities could have
been provided. To this day there are able lawyers in the sta:e
who maintain that the Pennsylvania system of administering
equity through common law forms was capable of such develop-
ment as to fulfill all the requirements of the state, and that the
giving of equity powers to the courts by the legislature was
entirely unnecessary.
"sForum Vol. XI, No. 5, p. 108.
"Forum Vol. XI, No. 5, p. 100.
'See Adams v. Barrel, 26 Super. Ct. 641.
'Morton's Est., 201 Pa., 271.
8Huber v. Burke, 11 S. and R. 245, per Gibson.
"Morton's Est., 201 Pa., 271.
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The legislature evidently thought otherwise. When the early
prejudice against chancery had measurably died out, a change
took place in legislative policy. The statutes already cited show
that as a first step in the execution of this new policy a, few
specified equitable powers were conferred upon the courts. In
1830 a commission was appointed by the legislature to revise the
whole civil law of the state. In their report to the legislaturo
the commission recommended that the law courts be given full
chancery powers in regards to: (1) trustees; (2) trusts; (3) con-
trol of private corporations, unincorporated societies and partner-
ships; (4) discovery; (5) interpleader; (6) injunctions; (7)
specific performance. In 1836 the legislature passed a bill giving
to the common pleas courts of the several counties of the state
and to the Supreme Court, equity jurisdiction in the first three
cases suggested by the commissioners.8" To the Supreme Court
sitting in banc in Philadelphia and to the common pleas courts
of Philadelphia they gave equity jurisdiction in all the cases
reccommended by the commission.",
In 1840 the several courts of common pleas of the state were
given the powers and jurisdiction of a court of equity in cases
of account.8"
1nliadelphia County was 'given equity jurisdiction in cases
of fraud, accident, mistake and account in 1840,87 and in 1845
it was provided that this statute should be construed to give
jurisdiction "whether such fraud, mistake, accident, or account,
be actual or constructive." 8  The jurisdiction of Philadelphia
County was extended to cases of dower and partition by the act
of March 17th, 1845.89 In 1851 a bill was passed giving to the
courts of common pleas of the several counties "the same chancery
powers and jurisdictions which are now by law vested in the
court of 'common pleas of the city and county of Philadelphia."9"
As a result of this legislation the Pennsylvania courts possess
"nearly the whole jurisdiction of chancery." It is well settled,
N.Act of June 16, 1836, sec. 13, P. L. 789.
'Idem.
"Act of Oct. 13, 1840, sec. 19, P. L. (1811) 7.
'Act of June 13th, 1840, P. L. 671.
"Act of April 13, 1845, P. L. 542.
'P. L. 160. See also the act of April 22, 1863, P. L. 519. By the act
of July 7th, 1885, P. L. 257, this jurisdiction was extended to all the
counties in the state.
'Act of Feb. 14th, 1857, P. L. 39.
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however, that the courts of equity in Pennsylvania do not possess
the general powers of a court of chancery but only such as have
been conferred upon them by statute, and that the powers of the
courts are limited to cases which have been specified by the legis-
lature. Cases have frequently arisen of which the Pennsylvania
courts have refused to take cognizance, though plainly within the
jurisdiction of a court possessing general chancery powers.9'
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IN THE EQUITY COURTS OF PENNSYLVANIA.
ine necessity of resorting to an act of assembly as a war-
rant lor exercising equity jurisdiction in any case has lead to a
curious result in regaras .o tue specinc performance ot contracts.
the act of 1836, as extended by the act of 1851, gives to the
courts of common pleas "the power and jurisdiction of a court
of chancery so tar as relates to the atording specific relief whe?
a recovery in damages would be inadequate.
In Kaufman's Appeal 55 Pa. 383, it was held that, under this
statute, the courts did not have jurisdiction to entertain a bill
for specific performance on behalf of the vendor where the Lec LC
sought was simply one for the payment of the purchase money.
The decision was based upon the principle that, as the demand
of the vendor was simply for the payment of the purchase money,
which could be as readily recovered in an action at law, the case
did not fall within the equity head of granting "specific relief
where a recovery in damages would be inadequate," and that to
allow a resort to equity in such a case would be to annul the
legislation of the state, which confines the executions for debt
to the property of a citizen, by extending to the plaintiff those
remedies against the person which belong exclusively to a court
of equity; in effect, to allow again imprisonment for debt. This
case has been followed in others,9z and, not nothwithstanding
the elaborate argument to the contrary by Mr. Justice Lowrie,
93
must be considered the undoubted rule in 'Pennsylvania.94
It is submitted that the doctrine of these cases is erroneous.
The" origin of eqfiity jurisdiction in cases of specific performance
was due to the inadequacy of the legal remedies, and this has re-
'1Pitcairn v. Pitcairn, 201 Pa., 372.
"Dee's Appeal, 57 Pa., 467; Smatlz Appeal, 99 Pa., 310.
"Findlay v. Aiken, 1 Grant 63.
DDorff v. Schmunk, 197 Pa., 300.
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mained the test of the jurisdiction. Nevertheless the equity courts
of England and of the other states of the Union have uniformly
decreed specific performance in favor of the vendor, though the
dccree soulgnt was simply one for the payment of the purchase
money, on the ground that the remedies in equity are mutual.
When the legislature gave to the courts the power and juris-
diction of a court of chancery, it necessarily referred to the
power and jurisdiction of courts of chancery in England or in th-.
other states, for no court of chancery existed in Pennsylvania.
And when the legislature stated that the courts should have. the
power of affording specific relief in cases "where a recovery in*
damages would be inadequate," it stated the test of equity juris-
diction in the same language as that in which it is stated in Eng-
land, and other states, which do not hesitate to entertain a bill
in favor of the vendor. The vendor's'bill is entertained in. other
jurisdictions on the ground that the remedies in equity should be
nmutual, and the equitable doctrine of mutuality of remedies has
been recognized, in other cases, by the courts of Pennsylvania.
When the vendor recovers the entire purchase price, either
at law or in equity, the sum recovered is not awarded as "dam-
ages." When the purchase money is so recovered it is specific
Rerformance. 9
The rule allowing a recovery of the purchase price in an
action at law is peculiar to Pennsylvania and a few other states,""
and it may be reasonably argued that in testing the adequacy of
the remedies at law, the remedies afforded by the common laal
should be looked to, and not the remedies afforded by the law of
Pennsylvania where "equity is so much a part of the law that the
word law means both law and equity or either.
'97
Finally, the doctrine of these cases is not consistent with the
doctrine of those cases which hold that the courts should construe
liberally the statutes granting to the courts equity powers.9  "By
the act of 1836 the judges are not clothed with partial and depend-
.ent, but with full and independent powers over all the subjects
therein mentioned. 9
WSunderland on Damages, 1610.
'Sunderland on Damages, 1608-10.
'Stockdale v. Ullery, 37 Pa., 487.
"Wesley Church v. Moore, 10 Pa., 273, Kilpatrick v. McDonald, 11
Pa., 381, Potter, Expansion of Equity in Penna.
"Penna. Lead Co's Appeal, 96 Pa., 116.
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It is held that a vendor is entitled to come into equity for
specific performance where the decree sought is not simply one for
tie payment of the purchase price but the vendor stands in need
of specific relief which a court of equity alone can grant! ii
Kaufman's Appeal it is said, "There are cases where a vendor
from a defect in his title or non-performance of a covenant in
time, or other cause, is unable to come up to the legal standard
of performance of his contract, but is still entitled to the aid of a
court of equity; or where the vendee is bound to do some acts
which a court of law cannot compel him specifically to perform
and where damages would be an inadequate remedy. in such
cases the vendor's bill falls within the head of equity power given
by the act of 1836 of 'affording specific relief where a recovery
in damages would be an inadequate remedy.'"
It is well settled that the courts of equity have jurisdiction
to decree specific performance in favor of the vendee.'
The statutory grant of a distinctive chancery jurisdiction to
afford "specific relief" does not in the least affect the power of
the common law courts to give specific relief in the common law
actions of ejectment and assumpsit.3
THE FOURTH SECTION OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NOT IN FORCE
IN PENNSYLVANIA.
The law of Pennsylvania concerning contracts for the sale
of land presents some striking and instructive peculiarities due
to the but partial adoption of the Statute of Frauds. Prior to
the adoption of the Statute of Frauds in England, neither con-
Iracts for the sale of land nor conveyances of land were required
to be in writing.4 As civilization advanced and estates in land
became more and more complex and divided in quantity of interest
and time of enjoyment, and as the feudal restraints upon the
alienation of lands from time to time wore off, written evidence
of contracts for the sale of land and conveyances of land became
more and more indispensible.
'Kaufman's Appeal, 55 Pa., 386; Tierman v. Rowland, 15 Penna. 429;
Findlay v. Aiken, 1 Grant 84.
'P. and L. Dig. Dec. col. 8615.
'Church v. Ruland, 64 Pa., 441; Corson v. Mulvany, 49 Pa., 48.
4Future interests and incorporeal hereditmanents were exceptions to
the ordinary rule.
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At last "to prevent a variety of frauds" Parliament passed
the Statute of Frauds.' By this statute a Niriting was made neces-
sary to the valid transfer of the title to real estate and all interests
in lands which were of greater, quantity than leases for three
years. In addition to this, the fourth section provided that "no
action shall be brought * * * * upon any contract or sale
of lands, tenements, or hereditamen'ts, or any interest in or con-
cerning them; * * * unless the agreement upon which such
action shall be brought, or some -note or memorandum thereof,
shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged there-
with, or some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized."
In the first case reported in the reports of Pennsylvania
it was decided thaft the English Statute of Frauds was not in
force in Pennsylvania., The reason given for the decision was
that the statutes passed in England after the settlement of Penn-
sylvania had no force in Pennsylvania unless the col6nies were
particularly named therein. Since the Statute of Frauds was
passed in 1677, four years before the granting of Penn's charter,
and six years before the actual settlement of the province, it
would seem to fall within the rule. The- court, however, decided
that though the statute was passed before the granting of Penn's
charter, the Governor of New York had exercised jurisdiction in
Pennsylvania before the passage of the stat-ite, by virtue of
the word "territories" in the grant to the Duke of York of New
York and New Jersey, and that the statute was therefore not
in force. The reasoning of the court in this case has been justly
criticized, and it has been stated that "the true reason, probably,
why the statute was not extended in practice to Pennsylvania
was that its provisions were inapplicable to the simplicity of the
earlier periods of Pennsylvania, and required greater expertness
than practitioners of those days generally possessed.
'7
In 1772 the Pennsylvania statute of frauds was passed. The
colonial assembly consolidated the first three sections of the
English statute and placed it on the statute books of Pennsyl-
vania. In regard to the ability of the drawer of the Pennsyl-
vania statute Gibson, C. J., said, "It is evident from the masterly
way in which they were consolidated by him that he was a lawyer
of no little skill." 8 A careful comparison of the Pennsylvania
'29 Car. II c. 3.
'Anon, 1 Dall., 1.
'Note to 1 Dallas, 1.
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statute with the first three sections of the English statute fails
to disclose any evidences of this "no little skill."
So much of the fourth section of the English Statute of
Frauds as required contracts for the sale of lands to be in writing
was not adopted in Pennsylvania. It was subsequently adopted,9
but was repealed the next year.10
Whether the fourth section was intentionally omitted from
the Pennsylvania statute cannot, at this day, be definitely deter-
mined. Chief Justice Tilghman and Mr. justice Shlarswood
expressed the opinion that the omission could not have been
accidental. In Pugh v. Good," Gibson expressed an opinion to
the contrary, and said that the fourth section must be taken to
be a part of the common law of- Pennsylvania, adopted by
analogy to the British statute. But notwithstanding the desire
of Gibson to incorporate the fourth section into "our own peculiar
common law," it is not now, and never has been, with the excep-
tion of the brief period already mentioned, a part of the law of
Pennsylvania.
The legislation of Pennsvlvania may be thus summarized:
thle first three sections of the English statute are drawn into one
which provides that estates created orally and "without a writing
-,i-ned by the party creating the same," etc., shall have "the force
and effect of estates at will only :" there is no provision corres-
nonlig to the fourth section of the English statute.
As a result of the distinctive legislation in Pennsylvania a
peculiar condition of the law has arisen. The rules defining the
conditions tinder which, and the extent to which, contracts for
the sale of real estate may be enforced differ materially from
those prevailing in England and in other states where the fourth
section has been adopted. These riiles and the reasons upon
which they are based have been ably discussed in two previous
numbers of this toiblication. Tt will be sufficient here to summarize
tlem as follows:
(1) A nurchaser is not entitled to the specific performance
of an oral contract for the sale of real estate.
(2) A nurchaser is not entitled to the specific verformance of
n written contract for the sale of real estate if the written contract
'Murphy v. Herbert, 7 Pa., 423.
9Act of April 22, 1856, P. L. 533.
"Act of May 13, 1857, P. L. 500.
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is not signed by the vendor, even though it is signed by the pur-
chaser.
(3) In either of the cases (1) or (2) a purchaser is entitled
to specific performance if there has been such part performance
on his part as to take the case out of the statute.11
(3) A purchaser is entitled to the specific performance of a
written contract for the sale of real estate if the contract is signed
by the vendor, even though it is not signed by the purchaser.
and there has been no part performance.
(5) A vendor cannot recover in an action at law the purchase
price agreed upon in an oral contract for the sale of real estate.
(6) If the purchaser by part performance has placed himself
in a position to demand specific performance, the vendor may
recover the purchase price in an action at law even though the
contract is oral. 12
(7) A vendor is entitled to recover in an action at law the
purchase price agreed upon in a written contract for the sale of
,real estate, if the written contract is signed by the vendor, even
though it is not signed by the purchaser. This is the rule although
there has been no part performance by the purchaser. If there
has been such part performance a still stronger case is presented.
(8) A vendor cannot recover in an action at law the purchase
price agreed upon in a written contract for the sale of real estate
if the contract is not signed by the vendor, even though it 's signed
by the purchaser.
18
(9) A purchaser may recover in an action at law dawages
for the breach of an oral contract for the sale of real estate.
In absence of fraud the measure of damages is the purchase
money actually paid and the expense actually incurred. Damages
cannot be recovered for the loss of the bargain. When the
default on the part of the vendor involves fraud the measure
of damages becomes enlarged so as to include the loss of the bar-
gain. When no part of the consideration has been paid and no
'The essential elements .of this part performance have been variously
stated. See P. and L. Dig. Dec., Vol. 20, c. 3472.
'No Pennsylvania case has so decided but it would appear to follow
from the reason on which rule (5) is based. See 6 Pom. Eq., 1291, 1352
and cases there cited.
"No Penna. case has expressly so decided but the rule follows from
the reasoning on which rule (5) is based. But see Schultz v. Weir,
6 Sup. Ct. 573.
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expense incurred and there has been no fraud, the damages-are
merely nominal.
(10) This (9) is the measure of damages even though the
contract is in writing and by the vendor, or by both vendee and
vendor.14
(11) A vendor may recover in an action at law damages for
the breach of an oral contract for the sale of real estate. The
measure of damages is the difference between the value of the
land at the time of the breach and the sum agreed upon in the
contract. 5
W. H. HITCHLER.
"This rule and the preceeding one do not result from the statute of
frauds. They are due to other considerations.
'That the rule in this case is different from that "n (9) has been
overlooked by several learned writers. See Rood on the Statute of Frauds,
Mitchell on Real Estate in Penna., Carner v. Peters, 9 Sup. Ct. 29.
MOOT COURT.
SAMUEL STOPE vs. R. R. CO.
Crossing a Railroad Track when told to do so by the Watchman.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
At a crossing, the company had for- several years maintained a watch-
man and safety gates. This watchman had acqu'red a good reputation
for fidelity and care. He was never known* to omit proper warnings
to passengers about to cross the tracks and to close the gates when the
approach of trains required. On July 3d, 1907, Stopes was approaching
the tracks in a wagon, and was about to descend from it, in order to
examine the tracks before driving upon them, when the watchman ifted
the gate, that had been closed, and halloed to him to come on. Obeying,
Stope drove upon the tracks when his wagon was truck and destroyed.
His horse was killed. This is an action where he seeks to recover the
value of the horse and wagon. Defense is contributory negligence.
Evidence showed a speed of train of 50 miles an hour, in a borough of
9,000 people, where the crossing was, and a failure to whistle or ring
the bell.
HANEE for Plaintiff.
REiGEEL mDPR for the Defendant.
YARNELL, J.-This is an action in which the plaintiff, Stope, seeks
to recover the value of a horse and wagon destroyed by a train at a
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railroad crossing. The defense offered is contributory negligence on
the part of Stope.
Approaching the tracks, Stope was about to descend from his wagon
and examine the tracks before driving upon. them, when the watchman
lifted a closed gate and told him to come on. Acting upon the invitation
of the watchman, Stope drove upon the tracks when his wagon was
struck and his horse killed.
The question to be decided is, did Stope in any manner contribute
to his own injury?
The speed of the train and the failure to whistle or ring the bell
may or rather do show negligence on the part of the R. R. Co., but no
amount of negligence on the part of the Railroad Company will help
Stope in this action if it can be shown that he neglected his duty or
contributed to his injury. 127 Pa., 297, Lake Shore v. Frantz.
The rule that a person must stop, look, and listen, before attempting
to cross a railroad track, is inflexible and admits of no exceptions;
a failure to observe it is not merely evidence of neg-gence but is negli-
gence per se.
Failure to give a signal does not relieve persons of contributory
negligence in crossing railroad tracks at a crossing. 95 U. S., 697. In
Greenwood v. R. R. Co., 124 Pa., 572, it is held that a person must observe
the rule of stop, look, and listen, whether safety gates are maintained
or not and whether or not the railroad company observes the speed
regulations.
A point that deserves the most careful consideration, is the fact
that the watchman invited Stope to come on when he was about to get
down from his wagon and examine the tracks for himself.
There is a conflicting opin-on as to whether looking and listening
is necessary where there is a flagman and where the plaintiff stops. 42
N. Y. L. 180.
The rule in Pennsylvania is inflexible, however, and requires a sub-
stantial compliance with the rule-stop, look, and listen.
It is negligent to so far assume the care of the watchman, as to
omit the use of one's own senses, for the detection of an approaching
train, one's duty in this respect not being modified by the presence of
safety gates or other contrivances for the public protection. 127 Pa.,
297, Lake Shore & M. S. -R. Co. v. F.
Safety gates were intended as an additional safeguard of public
travel and not to relieve the traveler from any care otherwise due for his
own protection. 124 Pa., 572, Greenwood v. Phil. W. & B. R. Co.
The flagman acts as an additional safeguard and is a necessity where
there are gates.
Although extra precautions are taken by the company the duty for
every traveler to stop, look, and listen, still exists. The fact that there
is a flagman at the crossing does not dispense with the rule stop, look,
and listen, even when the flagman beckons the traveler to cross. 25
W. N. C., 250.
Coleman v. P. R. R. Co., 195 Pa., 485, differs from this in that the
action there was brought by a party who received his injury from being
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in the rear of the wagon. He had no control over the horse as there
was a driver on the seat. The case holds that the driver could not have
recovered had he brought the action.
The rule of stop, look, and listen, is not a rule of evidence but an
unbending rule of law which the jury can never be permitted to ignore.
Here Stope was about to get down from his wagon and examine the
tracks for himself but he did not and relied on the senses of the flagman.
In this neglect of the rule, stop, look, and listen, he contributed to his
own injury and is therefore remediless.
Plaintiff nonsuit.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
That the defendant's negligence was a -cause of the accident, the
jury might well have found. Its train was running through a borough
of 9000 inhabitants at a speed of 50 miles per hour. Nor did it whistle
or ring a bell.
The question remains whether any negligence of the plaintiff con-
tributed to the accident. It would not have happened, it is clear, if the
plaintiff had not advanced upon the track. Was that act negligence?
And who should decide whether it was or not?
That ordinarily, it would be the duty of a traveller, who is about
to cross a track, to stop, look, and listen, is not to be questioned. The
question here is, whether the fact made an exception. That fact is that
the plaintiff did stop, and was about to look and listen, when he was
caused to desist from the effort and immediately to advance upon the
tracks by the direction of the flagman. There is perhaps, no case clearly
holding that this act would not dispense from the duty of looking and
listening. In Thrig v. Erie Railroad Co., 210 Pa., 98, a flagman gave a
signal to come on, but apparently it was directed not to the plantiff
but to one who was in a vehicle 30 or 40 feet in advance of him. The
plaintiff was unable to say that the signal was intended for him. It is
said, that the duty of stopping, looking, and listening, is absolute. In
Coleman v. Penna. R. R., 195, Pa., 485, the trial court said that one who
drives on a track, must stop, look and listen, although the watchman has
given him a signal to cross, but the remark was dictum. In Greenwood
v. Railroad Co., 124 Pa., 572, the -safety gate was out of order, and for
that reason, was not down. Greenwood and others, runn;ng with a hose-
carriage to a fire, were not, for that reason, warranted to infer that there
was no danger, and without stopping and looking, to dash across the
track. Cf. Lohrey v. Penna. R. R., 36 Super. 287. In Lake Shore R. R.
v. Frantz, 127 Pa., 295 the duty of stopping is indeed said to be "absolute
and unyielding" but the remark was a dictum. The use made of the fact
that the gates were raised was, not to exonerate the plaintiff from the
duty of stopping, but to fasten negligence on the railroad company for
its "blunting the edge" of the plaintiff's caution. Burd v. Railroad
Co., 25 W. N. C. 250, a common pleas decision is of little value, since no
opinions are given. Cohen v. Pa. R. R. 211 Pa., 227, apparently assumes
that the traveller must stop, look and listen, before going upon the first of
several tracks. But the accident did not occur on the first track.
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The safety gates were up, but that fact did not relieve from the duty
of ordinary care, before venturing on the second or third tracks. The
omission to stop, look and listen, before thus venturing, however, was
not negligence per se.
That the invitation of the flagman to cross may legitimately influence
the decision of the driver, is conceded in some cases. "It may be con-
ceded," says Dean J., Ayers v. Railway Co., 201 Pa., 124, "that if the
track had been as visible to him as to the flagman, he could not without
negligence have disregarded his own sense of sight and have relied on
the mistake or carlessness of the flagman. But plaintiff could not see a
train, and heard no warning. He knew the flagman was experienced
and could see. Why should he not cross? He could see no train;
the flagman who could see and was placed there to see, in effect
said to him there was none. Under such circumstances we cannot say
there was an absence of ordinary care in plaintiff relying on the sight of
the flagman, when, because of the freight train, his own could not avail
him." In Fennell v. Harris, 184 Pa., 578, reliance on a signal of the
watchman was held not inconsistent with requisite care.
It is, intimated in some cases, that before entering on the first track,
the traveller must in every case, stop, look and listen; but that, having
passed the first second or third track safely, whether he must stop, look
and listen before entering upon the second, third or fourth track must
be decided by the jury and not by the court. But, it is quite clear that
justifications similar to those for crossing the second, third or fourth track
without stopping, etc., might exist, for crossing the first, without' stopping.
The situation might be such that orcoming trains could -not be seen
or heard a sufficient distance to avoid collision. What then would be the use
of stopping? The practicable place for stopping might ,require the
driver to dismount, run ahead some distance, then run back, remount,
and drive over the interval, so losing sufficient time to bring on the train
soon enough to collide with him. In such a case it might be more sensible
to trust the eyes and ears of a flagman at the track, than to insist on
applying one's own eyes and ears. The traveller may be blind. Surely he
would not be expected then to prefer his own eyes to those of the watch-
man. He might be deaf. Must he then use his own ears? It is indeed
a. hard saying that in no case may one about to cross a track, even
when commanded by the watchman to do so, accept the testimony of
the senses of the latter, as a substitute for his own. Stope actually
stopped. We are bound to assume that it was at the proper place. He
was about to get out and run forward to the track when the shout of the
flagman induced him to desist.
We think the learned court should not have dec:ded, but should
have allowed the jury to decide, whether this act of the plaintiff was
negligent. In P. & R. R. R. v. Boyer, 97 Pa., 91, the court below said
that the driver of a street car, which was struck by a train, was not
bound to stop, look and listen, since the flagman had beckoned to him
to cross. The accuracy of this instruction was denied by Gordon J.,
only because there was conflicting evidence whether the flagman did thus
beckon, and because it appeared that another man had called and gestured
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to the driver not to cross, so that he had warn-ng of danger. Gordon J.,
remarks "Surely he ought to have stopped, looked for himself or asked
the flagman so to do, and this the more so, as Spencer was doing all in
his power to warn him of the coming danger." Evidently Gordon J.,
had not yet discovered that it would be negligent to trust to the assur-
ance of the flagman's own observations.
We are aware that the authorities are in conflict upon the question
here involved. See W. P. R. R. v. Rosewater, 157 Fed. 168; 15 L. R. A.
N. S. We are unwilling to say, without regard to the c~rcumstances,
that despite the direction of the company's watchman, -not to look and
listen, despite his assurance that he sees nothing and hears nothing to
induce hesitation to cross the track, the traveller is per se negligent, if
he fails to stop, look and listen. The question, we think, should be sub-
mitted to the jipry.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
ISIAIAH SHERBAN vs. JOHN GERDY.
Assumpsit-Conditional Sale-Rescission of Contract.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Gerdy let to Sherban for one year an engine. The value of the
engine was $600. Sherban was to pay each month as rental $50.
Within a month after the expiration of the year, having paid the monthly
installments, he might pay $20 additionally, whereupon Gerdy was to
make him a bill of sale. After paying ten installments monthly of $50
Sherban was unable to pay, and did not pay, any more. Within one
month after the expiration of the year, Gerdy brought replevin and
recovered the engine. Alleging that this was a rescission of the contract,
and that the $50 installments were, for the most part, not rentals but
fractions of the price of the engine, Sherban sues to recover a proper
proportion of the money paid. He alleges that a fair rental for the year
could not have exceeded $100 and that he should recover $400. Where-
upon he brings this suit.
MAUcH for Plaintiff.
SILVERMAN for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
JENKINS, J.-We think that Sherban is clearly entitled to recover
the $400 being the amount paid by him to Gerdy in excess of the fair
rental value.
Justice Dean in Seanon and Bierer Appellants vs. McLaughlin, 165 Pa.
150, says: "On default in payment the plaintiffs were not bound to
accept the machine or retake possession of it, they could have entered
judgment on the bond and levied on the machine and any other property
of the defendant in satisfaction of their demand. But they rescinded
the contract by retaking into their possession the subject of it, which
they had a right to- do, and then immediately entered judgment on their
bond and issued execution and levied on other property of the defendant,
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which they had no right to do, for the contract to which the bond was
collateral, no longer existed."
There being no contract between Sherban and Gerdy as soon as
the latter chose to exercise his right and retake the machine, he was
indebted to plaintiff for sum previously paid to him on the strength of such
agreement.
In Campbell vs. Hickok, 140 Pa. 290, the court held: "The company
had its remedies for the enforcement of their rights, one in affirmance
of the contract by suit upon the note, or they might rescind the contract
and repossess themselves of the property, in which case the Company
were to have and enjoy the said property as though the contract had
never been made, The notes were given in consideration of the agree-
ment, or of the hire of the property. The agreement and the notes
were part and parcel of the one transaction. If the agreement had never
been made, the notes would not have been given, and when the agree-
ment is rescinded with like effect as if it had never been made, the notes
fall with it for want of consideration." This same doctrine is held
in Scott vs. McHugh Appellant, 151 Pa., 630.
Justice Mestrezat, in the Roller Co. vs. Schlimme, 220 Pa. 413, says:
"The failure to make the payments as they became due was a breach
of the contract, and the plaintiff had a right to rescind and take possession
of the rollers and remove same without trespass. There was one condi-
ton however imposed upon the plaintiff Company's action in this respect,
and that was that if it took possession of the machinery and thereby
rescinded the agreement, it could not demand payment of the unpaid
;nstallments of the money provided for in the contract. When the
plaintiffs asserted their right to rescind by repossessing itself of the
machine, they waived their alternative right to enforce the agreement
by compelling the payment of the purchase money. The remedies were
alternative not cummulative. The right to repossess itself of the machin-
ery was not confined to any period of time. The Company could take
the machine in default of payment of any of the installments, or, at its
own pleasure, it could wait until all of the consideration money was
due, at any time thereafter take possession of the machine. Act of
plaintiff was a rescission of the contract and deprived the plaintiff of any
right of action on the contract, or on the notes, to enforce payment of
the money stipulated to be paid. The plaintiff cannot retake the machine,
and at the same time demand payment of its value. The contract does
not so specify and justice will not permit it."
All of the above cases hold that the retaking of the machine amounts
to a rescission of the contract. If the vendor chooses to rescind the contract
it is imperative that he return the consideration paid "'On the ground
of fraud, failure of consideration, and the like, rescission of the contract
is a right in equity, subject to a restoration of the consideration, con-
sequently in order to obtain equity, it lies on the party seeking to do
equity; that is to say, he must return the property obtained or reconvey
the title." 61 Pa. 427. "In the rescission of a contract, the very first
thing to be done after showing that the plaintiff parted with the thing
in -pursuance of the contract alleged, is to show that the plaintiff has
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rescinded the contract by doing, or offering to do, all that was necessary
and reasonably possible to restore the party to the condition in which
they were before the contract and then to show that he has good
grounds for rescinding it." 44 Pa. 9; 30 Pa. 145; 2 Watts, 433.
Before Gerdy undertook to repossess himself of the machine, he
should have tendered Sherban the amount paid by him in pursuance of
the contract, and he is liable to Sherban for the $400 on account of his
failure so to do, and judgment is accordingly entered for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The decision of the learned court below is well sustained by the
authorities cited. If, as is held in Road Roller Co. v. Schlinne, 220 Pa.,
413 the vendor-bailor could not recover on notes given for installments
that had alredy fallen due after the retaking of the rollers, because such
retaking was in virtue of a rescission, and because, upon rescission, the
vendor-bailor is not entitled to the contract money, it follows that upon
rescission, installments already paid should be recoverable by the bailee-
vendee.
The case referred to failed to take note of the fact that the bailee-
vendee had had the rollers for over two years and had been using them.
They were probably not in as good condition as when they were delivered.
No compensation for this use was allowed. In order to do justice, it
will be necessary to feign a contract that the bailee-vendee will pay for
such use, what 4t is reasonably worth. It is found that a fair rental of
the engine would have been about $100 and this has been deducted from
the money paid by the bailee-vendee.
Judgment affirmed.
JOHN EDWARDS vs. THOI1. McFARLANE.
Sale of Land-Fraud in flaking Deed-Reformation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
McFarlane employed Jones to sell land. He had a piece containing
four acres rectangular with a front of 70 feet on X street. Jones pre-
pared a deed which embraced the whole tract for the consideration of
$800 and which Edwards approved. The deed was sent to McFarlane
for execution. He resolved to sell only a part of this tract, fifty feet
in front, but for $800. The deed was sent to Edwards, who, keeping
it two weeks, paid the $800. Six months later, alleging that he had not
read the deed, he insisted on a rectification of it so as to embrace the
whole tract. McFarlane declining, Edwards filed a bill asking the
court that McFarlane be compelled to execute another deed.
CASE for Complainant.
BROWN for Respondent.
OPINION OF COURT.
MAUCH, J.-This is a bill seeking to rectify an executed deed so
that it may conform to an agreement previously entered into by the
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parties to this suit. The fact, that the deed in question does not conform
to the agreement, is uncontroverted. And "it is plain that if the
:nstrument has not been drawn so as to express the true intention 6f the
parties, the only true measure of justice in such a case is the equitable
remedy by reformation, or correction, by means of which the instrument
is made to conform to the intention of the part:es, and is then enforced
in its corrected shape." fBispham's Equity, 646.
To reform a contract, and then enforce it in its new shape, it must
appear from the facts that there was a mistake on the one side, and a
fraud on the other. 192 Pa. 19.
Do the facts, as presented in this case, justify us in saying that there
was fraud on the part of McFarlane and mistake on the part of
Edwards?
Fraud in equity has a wider signification than it has at law. Equity
takes cognizance of every possible kind of fraud from a civil point of view.
Courts of equity have, however, refrained to lay down anything that
approaches a satisfactory definition of fraud. So this court, with a
latent wisdom born of patient ignorance; reverently follows precedent, for
"the simple reason that the courts of equity have always avoided cir-
cumscribing the area of their jurisdiction in such cases by precise
boundaries, lest some new artifice, not thought of before, might enable
a wrongdoer to escape from the power of equitable redress."
In this case McFarlane was desirous to sell a certain .piece of land,
and Edwards was a prospective buyer. McFarlane's agent prepared a
deed which embraced the whole tract for the consideration of $800 and
which Edwards approved. The deed was sent to McFarlane for execu-
tion. He resolved to sell only a part of the tract, 50 feet in front, but for
$800. The deed was sent to Edwards, who keeping it two weeks, paid
the $800.
Was the non-disclosure of this resolution on the part of McFarlane
something "that was calculated to deceive?" Was it an "artifice by
which" Edwards "was deceived to. his disadvantage?" 90 Pa. 250.
We think it was. Edwards approved the deed as prepared by the agent,
and if McFarlane wished to make any changes, it was his clear duty, from
"what has passed in the transaction" and the "relationship between the
parties," to disclose it. And "where disclosure becomes a duty, such
silence is a fraud." 93 Pa. 107.
A mistake exists when a person, under some erroneous conviction
of law or fact, does, or omits to do, some act which, but for the erron-
eous conviction, he would not have done or omitted. Mistake may arise
either from unconsciousness, ignorance, forgetfulness, imposition, or
misplaced confidence. Where the mistake arises from imposition or mis-
placed confidence, relief may be had on the ground of fraud. 134 N. Y. 62.
Relief, when deeds or other instruments are executed by mistake or
inadvertence, as well as upon false suggestions, is a common head of equity
jurisdiction. 153 Pa. 134.
The mistake of Edwards was such as any reasonable man might
make; and McFarlane was well aware of this fact. And again, reason-
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ableness of the mistake is not so much the criterion to go by, as the fact
that the mistake was actually made.
The defendant, however, contends that Edwards should be denied
relief because he was guilty of laches and negligence; that he has an
adequate and complete remedy at law. "'Laches and negligence are always
discountanced. Nothing can call a court of chancery into activity but
conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence, and where these are
wanting, the court is passive and does nothing." A court of equity
does not encourage stale claims, and a party may lose his right to com-
plain of a fraud by his delay. There is no certain rule as to the length
of time which will bar the right to relief in cases of fraud. What is a
reasonable time must depend upon the discretion of the court, the exercise
of which will be regulated by the circumstances of the particular case.
In 4 Howard 503, it was said: "Although courts of equity generally
adopt the statutes of limitation, yet, in a case of actual fraud, they will
grant relief within the lifetime of either of the parties upon whom the
fraud is proved, or within 30 years after it has been discovered or become
known to the party whose rights are affected by it."
In view of the above case and the circumstances of the case at bar,
would it be an abuse of the discretion placed in us if we held Edwards
innocent of such laches and negligence as would defeat his claim?
The mere omission to take advantage of means of knowledge within the
reach of the party paying does not prevent recovery. 173 Pa. 579.
A court of law may construe and enforce an instrument as it stands,
or may refuse, upon proper cause shown, to give any effect to it, or
may treat it as a nullity. 90 Pa. 228. But if the instrument has not
been drawn so as to express the true intention of the parties, to enforce
it in its existing condition would be simply to carry out the very mistake
or fraud complained of; while to set it aside would deprive the com-
plainant of those advantages under the contract, to which he is lawfully
entitled.
It is obvious, therefore, that the only true measure of justice in such
a case is the equitable remedy by reformation, by means of which the
instrument is made to conform to the intention of the parties,, and is then
enforced in its corrected shape.
Decree entered accordingly.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
Courts of equity cannot make contracts fqr parties. If parties have
made a contract, and the writing which they cause to embody it fails in
some respect to do so, courts of equity may reform the writing so that it
shall correspond with the real understanding of the- parties. Is th's
the reformation that is sought by the bill?
Jones the agent of McFarlane, prepared a deed purporting to convey
a tract of land 70 feet in width belonging to McFarlane, for $800. Jones
had had no authority to sell more than 50 feet of this tract, and when he
sent the deed to McFarlane for execution, the latter declined to execute
it. Another deed for the 50 feet was drawn up, and was sent to Edwards,
who had agreed to buy the 70 feet for $800, and had assented to the first
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deed. Edwards, not observing that the second deed sent to him differed
from the first, kept it for two weeks and then paid the $80. Six months
later he discovered the fact. He now asks the court to compel McFarlane
to execute a deed like the first.
Since McFarlane never intended to sell the 70 feet for $800, to compel
him to make a deed for it, would be to force on him a contract to
convey and a conveyance, into which he has never consented to enter;
would be, not to reform the deed so as to correspond with the intention
of the two parties, but to substitute for it one agreeing with the inten-
tion of the grantee, while wholly disagreeing with that of the grantor.
It may be that Edwards is entitled to relief of some sort. He has
not obtained what he supposed that he was obtaining. He would probably
not have desired the 50 feet actually got by him, separate from the
other 20 feet or at all events, he would not have been willng to pay
$800 for the 50 feet. What then? The remedy to which he is entitled,
if any, is the return of the purchase money, upon his return of the deed,
or upon his reconveyance of the 50 feet. It is inequitable to allow him to
compel McFarlane to aliene to him the 20 feet without the compensation
for which alone McFarlane would be willing to convey it. Coppes v.
Keystone P. & F. Co., 36 Superior, 38.
Decree reversed and bill dismissed.
BOOK REVIEW.
The Law of lter-Corporate Relations, by WALTER CHAD-
WICK Noym, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1909.
This is the second edition of a book which first appeared in 1903,
made necessary, as the author states, by the "development" of the law
since the appearance of the first edition. The work deals with the consol-
idation of corporations, sales of corporate property, corporate stbck-
holding, holding corporations, combinations among corporations, leases
of corporate property, and franchises, the anti-trust federal statute, and
allied top cs. It is easy to discern, from this summary, the vast impor-
tance of the subjects dealt with. The profession had learned the value
of this work from its first edition. The second notably enhances its ser-
viceableness. The statements of law are clear and precise and the cita-
tions full. As in the case of all the books issued by Little, Brown & Co.,
paper is fine, and the letter-press all that could be desired. The new
edition can be earnestly commended to the attention of that large number
of lawyers that have to do with corporate problems.
